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The “drunk utilitarian” phenomenon suggests that people are more likely to accept harm for the greater good when they are 
under the influence of alcohol. This phenomenon conflicts with the ideas that (1) acceptance of pro-sacrificial harm requires 
inhibitory control of automatic emotional responses to the idea of causing harm and (2) alcohol impairs inhibitory control. 
The current preregistered experiment aimed to provide deeper insights into the effects of alcohol on moral judgments by 
using a formal modeling approach to disentangle three factors in moral dilemma judgments and by distinguishing between 
instrumental harm and impartial beneficence as two distinct dimensions of utilitarian psychology. Despite the use of a 
substantially larger sample and higher doses of alcohol compared to the ones in prior studies, alcohol had no significant 
effect on moral judgments. The results pose a challenge to the idea that alcohol increases utilitarianism in moral judgments.  
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Most people would probably agree that physically 
harming people is wrong; but what if doing so (e.g., by 
torturing someone) would save the lives of ten 
innocent people? Such moral dilemmas are often used 
to highlight the tension between deontology and 
consequentialism. Utilitarianism, as a particular type 
of consequentialism, posits that moral decisions 
should be guided solely by what brings about the best 
consequences and so, if torturing someone saves lives, 
it can be acceptable (e.g., Mill, 1863). In contrast, 
deontological ethical theories posit that morality is 
about more than just consequences, but should be 
guided by rights, duties, and obligations (e.g., Kant, 
1916), and therefore often assume that harming 
someone is morally wrong.  
In the current research, we investigated how 
alcohol influences moral judgments when adhering to 
“deontological” moral norms conflicts with the 
“utilitarian” maximization of outcomes for the greater 
good. According to the dual-process model of moral 
dilemma judgments, “utilitarian” acceptance of harm 
requires inhibitory control of automatic emotional 
responses to the idea of causing harm (Greene et al., 
2001, 2004). In line with these assumptions, 
acceptance of harm for the greater good has been 
found to decrease under conditions assumed to impair 
inhibitory control, including time pressure and 
cognitive load (Białek & De Neys, 2017; Greene et al., 
2008; Suter & Hertwig, 2011). However, one 
intriguing finding that seems rather puzzling in light of 
these results is the phenomenon of the “drunk 
utilitarian” (Duke & Bègue, 2015). This phenomenon 
suggests that people are more likely to accept harm for 
the greater good when they are under the influence of 
alcohol, which seems difficult to reconcile with the 
ideas that (1) acceptance of harm for the greater good 
requires inhibitory control of automatic emotional 
responses to the idea of causing harm (Greene et al., 
2001, 2004) and (2) alcohol impairs inhibitory control 
(Day et al., 2015; Noël et al., 2010; Weafer & 
Fillmore, 2016). 
The main goal of the current research was to 
provide deeper insights into the effect of alcohol on 
utilitarian moral judgment by using a formal modeling 
approach to disentangle sensitivity to consequences, 
sensitivity to moral norms, and general action 
tendencies in responses to moral dilemmas 
(Gawronski et al., 2017) and by distinguishing 
between two dimensions of utilitarian psychology 
called impartial beneficence and instrumental harm 
(Everett & Kahane, 2020; Kahane et al., 2018). 
Alcohol and Moral Judgment 
The “drunk utilitarian” phenomenon was 
discovered by Duke and Bègue (2015) in two studies 
that investigated associations between moral 
judgments and blood alcohol concentration measured 
with a breathalyzer in patrons of French bars. In the 
first study, participants were asked to imagine two 
scenarios in which a runaway trolley is approaching a 
group of five workers. In a scenario called the switch 
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dilemma, participants were asked if they would pull a 
switch to redirect the trolley to a different track where 
it would kill one person and save the lives of the five 
workers (Foot, 1967). In another scenario called the 
footbridge dilemma, participants were asked if they 
would push a man from a bridge, which would kill the 
man but save the five workers (Thomson, 1976). 
Blood alcohol concentration showed a significant 
positive correlation with pro-sacrificial judgments in 
the footbridge dilemma (r = .29, p = .023) but not the 
switch dilemma (r = .17, p = .17). The second study 
replicated the correlation between blood alcohol and 
pro-sacrificial judgments in the footbridge dilemma (r 
= .32, p = .039), further showing that the obtained 
relation was not driven by self-reported behavioral 
disinhibition or elevated positive mood.  
To rule out ambiguities in Duke and Bègue’s 
(2015) correlational findings, Arutyunova and 
colleagues (2017) experimentally manipulated blood 
alcohol levels in a community sample of volunteer 
participants in a two-session study. In both sessions, 
participants were asked to respond to a longer battery 
of moral dilemmas that included the switch and the 
footbridge dilemma (Cushman et al., 2006). In one of 
the two sessions, participants responded to the moral 
dilemmas under the influence of alcohol (i.e., 42 
minutes after drinking juice mixed with vodka; 1 g of 
alcohol at 40% strength for each 1 kg of body weight). 
In the other session, they completed the same 
dilemmas while being sober (i.e., after drinking juice 
mixed with water). Results did not reveal any 
significant difference in moral judgments across the 
two conditions.  
Francis and colleagues (2019) investigated effects 
of alcohol on moral dilemma judgments among 
psychology students who were randomly assigned to 
one of three experimental conditions: (1) placebo, (2) 
low-intoxication level (0.4 g of alcohol at 37.5% 
strength for each 1 kg of body weight), and (3) high 
intoxication-level (0.8 g of alcohol at 37.5% strength 
for each 1 kg of body weight). Twenty minutes after 
drinking either plain juice or juice mixed with different 
amounts of vodka, participants responded to a battery 
of moral dilemmas including the footbridge dilemma 
(Greene et al., 2001). Similar to Arutyunova et al.’s 
(2017) findings, moral judgments did not significantly 
differ across experimental conditions. 
The Current Research 
In the current preregistered experiment, we aimed 
to address five limitations of prior research on the 
effects of alcohol on moral judgment: (1) relatively 
low (or inconsistent) levels of alcohol consumption; 
(2) lack of a placebo condition in some studies; (3) 
small sample sizes; (4) confounds in the measurement 
of moral dilemma judgments; and (5) generalization to 
utilitarian judgments writ large based on responses to 
sacrificial dilemmas. 
First, because Duke and Bègue’s (2015) study 
used a correlational design, the obtained relations 
between blood alcohol concentration and moral 
judgment may not necessarily reflect a causal effect of 
alcohol. Subsequent laboratory experiments 
(Arutyunova et al., 2017; Francis et al., 2019) aimed 
to address this concern, and these studies did not find 
any significant effects of alcohol on moral judgments. 
However, the consumed doses of alcohol were 
relatively small in these experiments. To illustrate this 
concern: with the experimentally induced levels of 
blood alcohol in permille, participants would have still 
been allowed to drive in many countries (< 0.5‰). 
Thus, it is possible that the lack of a significant effect 
of alcohol in experimental studies is due to the 
relatively low levels of alcohol, not lack of a causal 
effect. In the current study, we aimed to address this 
issue by administering a comparatively higher dose of 
alcohol than previous experiments.  
Second, only one of the three studies (Francis et 
al., 2019) included a placebo condition in which 
participants believed they were consuming alcohol 
without actually consuming alcohol. Placebo 
conditions are essential in this line of research to 
distinguish actual effects of alcohol from effects of 
people’s naïve beliefs about the influence of alcohol 
(Bodnár et al., 2020). In the context of moral 
judgments, it is also possible that people believe that 
being intoxicated gives them a license to make more 
pro-sacrificial judgments, even when alcohol itself has 
no causal effect on moral judgments. In the current 
study, we aimed to address this issue by using three 
experimental conditions: (1) alcohol, (2) no-alcohol 
control, (3) placebo control.  
Third, the sample sizes in prior studies were rather 
small overall, with N = 61 and N = 42 in the two studies 
by Duke and Bègue (2015), N = 40 in the study by 
Arutyunova et al. (2017), and N = 48 in the study by 
Francis et al. (2019). Because small sample sizes can 
lead to both false negatives (Maxwell et al., 2015) and 
false positives (Button et al., 2013), evidence from a 
larger sample would be helpful to reconcile the 
conflicting findings in previous studies. In the current 
experiment, we aimed to address this issue by 
recruiting a relatively large sample of 300 participants. 
Fourth, all three studies relied on the traditional 
approach of using moral dilemmas that pit 
“characteristically utilitarian” against 
“characteristically deontological” options (Conway et 
al., 2018). A major disadvantage of this approach is 
that it includes two confounds in the measurement of 
moral dilemma judgments. First, endorsement of the 
“utilitarian” option requires rejection of the 
“deontological” option, and vice versa. This approach 
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confounds the measurement of utilitarian and 
deontological tendencies underlying moral judgments, 
which conflicts with the idea that the processes 
underlying the two kinds of tendencies are 
independent (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Second, 
“utilitarian” judgments are conflated with action (i.e., 
pulling the lever, pushing the man) while 
“deontological” judgments are conflated with inaction 
(i.e., not pulling the lever, not pushing the man), 
confounding the two moral tendencies with general 
action tendencies (Crone & Laham, 2017). These 
considerations suggest that differences in responses to 
traditional moral dilemmas (e.g., switch dilemma, 
footbridge dilemma) may reflect either (1) differences 
in outcome maximization, or (2) differences in 
adherence to moral norms, or (3) differences in general 
action tendencies (or any combination of the three). In 
the current research, we aimed to disentangle these 
three factors by using a mathematical model called the 
CNI model to quantify (1) sensitivity to consequences, 
(2) sensitivity to moral norms, and (3) general 
preference for inaction versus action in responses to 
moral dilemmas (Gawronski et al., 2017). The CNI 
model disentangles these three factors by comparing 
responses to four kinds of moral dilemmas that differ 
in terms of (1) whether the benefits of the described 
action are greater or smaller than the costs and (2) 
whether the described action is prohibited or 
prescribed by a moral norm. Disentangling the three 
factors underlying moral dilemma judgments may 
prove helpful for understanding the “drunk utilitarian” 
phenomenon, in that alcohol seems unlikely to 
increase sensitivity to consequences in a utilitarian 
sense. Instead, it seems more likely that alcohol either 
(1) reduces sensitivity to moral norms in a 
deontological sense or (2) increases people’s 
willingness to perform a focal action regardless of its 
consequences and its consistency with moral norms. In 
fact, if either of the latter two effects is sufficiently 
large, they may conceal a simultaneous decrease in 
sensitivity to consequences, which would suggest that 
alcohol might reduce rather than increase utilitarian 
concerns about the greater good (for an example, see 
Luke & Gawronski, 2021).  
Fifth, while work on the “drunk utilitarian” 
phenomenon—along with work on the dual-process 
model—has been used to draw conclusions about 
utilitarian judgment in general, pro-sacrificial 
judgments are just one part of utilitarian psychology. 
According to the two-dimensional model of utilitarian 
psychology (Everett & Kahane, 2020; Kahane et al., 
2018), utilitarianism has two dimensions that are 
conceptually and psychologically distinct. 
Instrumental harm (IH) captures willingness to cause 
harm to achieve positive consequences for the greater 
good. Impartial beneficence (IB) taps the extent to 
which people endorse the radically demanding and 
impartial helping utilitarianism requires. Different 
from previous work inferring utilitarianism from 
responses to sacrificial dilemmas, research guided by 
the two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology 
infers endorsement of IH and IB from participants’ 
agreement with broad ethical statements about key 
ideas of the two dimensions (Kahane et al., 2018). 
Previous work using this approach has shown that the 
two dimensions of utilitarianism show different 
patterns of correlations with individual-difference 
measures (Kahane et al., 2018), are affected differently 
by priming manipulations (Capraro et al., 2019), and 
have distinct consequences for social perception 
(Everett et al., 2018, 2021). Moreover, although 
endorsement of pro-sacrificial harm in moral 
dilemmas has been found to be positively correlated 
with IH, moral dilemma judgments were found to be 
unrelated to IB (Kahane et al., 2018). Thus, based on 
the known effects of alcohol, it seems possible that 
alcohol increases the endorsement of IH. However, it 
seems rather implausible that alcohol would increase 
endorsement of IB.  
In sum, the current study aimed to address the five 
identified limitations in a preregistered lab experiment 
testing the effects of a comparatively higher dose of 
alcohol (1.6 g of alcohol at 40% strength for each 1 kg 
of body weight) on “utilitarian” preferences. The study 
included three types of measures: (1) traditional 
sacrificial moral dilemmas (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 
1976), (2) a battery of moral dilemmas for research 
using CNI model (Körner et al., 2020), and (3) the 
Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS) measuring IH and 
IB (Kahane et al., 2018). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three experimental conditions: (1) 
alcohol, (2) no-alcohol, (3) placebo. To obtain greater 
statistical power than prior studies, we aimed for a 
sample of 300 participants (100 per condition). 
Preregistered Hypotheses 
For responses to the two variants of the trolley 
problem, we expected to obtain effects that correspond 
to Duke and Bègue’s (2015) correlational findings. For 
responses to the footbridge dilemma, we predicted 
greater pro-sacrificial responding in the alcohol 
condition compared to the no-alcohol and placebo 
conditions. For responses to the switch dilemma, pro-
sacrificial responding was not expected to differ across 
experimental conditions.  
For the three factors captured by the CNI model, 
we predicted that alcohol, compared to no-alcohol and 
placebo conditions, would (1) decrease sensitivity to 
consequences, (2) decrease sensitivity to moral norms, 
and (3) decrease general preference for inaction over 
action.  
Finally, for the IH dimension of the OUS, we 
predicted that alcohol would increase scores compared 
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to no-alcohol and placebo conditions. For the IB 
dimension, scores were not expected to differ across 
experimental conditions.  
Method 
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee 
of the University of Silesia. The preregistration, data, 
analysis codes, and study materials are available at 
https://osf.io/9vn5z/. 
Participants  
Our target sample size was 300 participants after 
preregistered exclusions, 100 (~50% female) per 
experimental condition. For the predicted interaction 
between experimental condition and type of trolley 
problem, a sample of 300 provides 80% power in 
detecting a small effect of f = 0.107, assuming a 
correlation of r = .30 between measures and 
nonsphericity correction of ε = 1. The same is true for 
detecting the predicted interaction between 
experimental condition and type of OUS subscale. For 
the three parameters of the CNI model, a sample of 300 
provides 80% power in detecting a small effect of f = 
0.097, assuming a correlation of r = .30 between 
measures and nonsphericity correction of ε = 1. 
Participants were recruited through 
advertisements in various media (e.g., university 
websites, Facebook, newspapers). Individuals with 
health problems, who were pregnant, who reported 
alcohol addiction, or were younger than 18 years 
before the laboratory invitation were not eligible for 
participation. To verify these criteria, all individuals 
who responded to the advertisements completed an 
online screening questionnaire before receiving an 
invitation to the lab study. Of the 1079 volunteers who 
completed the screening survey, 387 met the criteria 
and were invited to the laboratory (198 women, 189 
men; Mage = 25.7, SDage = 7.4; age range: 18 to 52 
years). All of the invited volunteers accepted the 
invitation and participated in the study voluntarily 
without monetary compensation. Participants were 
asked to refrain from drinking alcohol for 24 hours, 
taking any medication (e.g., painkillers) for 10 hours, 
and from eating for at least 3 hours before coming to 
the laboratory. Following our preregistered exclusion 
criteria, data from 58 participants were excluded from 
analyses because they failed to pass one or more of our 
attention checks. The final sample included 329 
participants, whose age ranged from 18 to 52 years (M 
= 25.1, SD = 6.2). Of the 329 participants in the final 
sample, 106 participants were in alcohol condition (53 
women, 53 men), 114 in placebo control condition (57 
women, 57 men), and 109 in the no-alcohol control 
condition (53 women, 56 men). Following our 
preregistered stopping rule, we ended the data 
collection on the day we reached our target sample of 
300 participants, but included the data from all 
participants who had an appointment on the same day. 
This led to an excess of 29 participants beyond our 
target sample of 300 participants. All future 
appointments after the day of completion were 
canceled in line with our preregistered stopping rule. 
Measures 
Trolley problems. Participants were presented 
with the switch dilemma (Foot, 1967) and the 
footbridge dilemma (Thomson, 1976) and asked to 
indicate whether they would perform the described 
action on 7-point rating scales. The end-points were 
labeled “I would definitely do nothing” (1) and “I 
would definitely pull the level” (7) for the switch 
dilemma, and “I would definitely do nothing” (1) and 
“I would definitely push the man onto the track” (7) 
for the footbridge dilemma.  
CNI dilemmas. Participants were asked to 
respond to a validated battery of 48 moral dilemmas 
for research using the CNI model (Körner et al., 2020). 
The battery included four variants of 12 basic 
dilemmas, varying as a function of (1) whether the 
benefits of the described action are greater or smaller 
than the costs and (2) whether the described action is 
prohibited or prescribed by a moral norm. Participants 
were asked if they would perform the described action. 
Responses were measured with dichotomous yes vs. 
no response options. Using the CNI model template 
files provided by Körner et al. (2020), the total 
numbers of yes vs. no responses on each type of 
dilemma were used to estimate three scores for each 
participant via multinomial modeling (Hütter & 
Klauer, 2016): a score reflecting sensitivity to 
consequences (C parameter); a score reflecting 
sensitivity to moral norms (N parameter); and a score 
reflecting general preference for inaction versus action 
(I parameter). Toward this end, the CNI model was 
fitted to the data for each participant following the 
procedures by Körner et al. (2020). CNI parameter 
estimations were conducted with the freeware 
multiTree (Moshagen, 2010), using random start 
values, two replications, and a maximum of 90,000 
iterations.  
OUS. Dimensions of utilitarianism were 
measured using the OUS (Kahane et al., 2018). The IB 
subscale includes five items measuring the extent to 
which people endorse the utilitarian demand for 
impartial helping (e.g., “It is morally wrong to keep 
money that one doesn’t really need if one can donate 
it to causes that provide effective help to those who will 
benefit a great deal”). The IH subscale includes four 
items measuring willingness to cause harm to achieve 
positive consequences for the greater good (e.g., “It is 
morally right to harm an innocent person if harming 
them is a necessary means to helping several other 
innocent people”). Participants were asked to indicate 
how much they agree with each statement, using 7-
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point rating scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree).   
CRT. For exploratory purposes, the study also 
included Primi et al.’s (2016) modified version of the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005). The CRT 
was included to identify potential effects of alcohol on 
cognitive reflection and to explore whether effects of 
alcohol on moral judgments are mediated by 
differences in cognitive reflection.  
Procedure 
Three research assistants were responsible for 
different tasks during a given session. The first 
assistant (informally referred to as policeman) was 
responsible for measuring participants’ weight and 
taking breathalyzer measurements. The second 
assistant (informally referred to as bartender) was 
responsible for preparing the drinks and the 
randomized assignment to the three experimental 
conditions. The third assistant (informally referred to 
as courier) was responsible for ensuring that all 
documents are signed before the study and for serving 
the drinks (being unaware of the experimental 
condition).  
Participants in the no-alcohol condition consumed 
a drink that included only juice and no alcohol. 
Participants in this condition were told that there was 
no alcohol in their drink. Participants in the placebo 
condition were told that there was alcohol in the drink 
and consumed a drink that included only juice and no 
alcohol, but was sprayed with alcohol to create the 
impression of alcohol consumption. Participants in the 
alcohol condition consumed an alcoholic drink that 
was prepared to contain 1.6 grams of alcohol at 40% 
strength for each 1 kg of the participant’s body weight. 
The drink was mixed with the same juice as in other 
conditions. After the study, participants in the alcohol 
condition had to wait to become sober or return home 
with a sober driver. 
Figure 1 presents an overview of the procedure. 
When participants arrived in the laboratory, they 
provided informed consent, had their weight and blood 
alcohol measured using a breathalyzer, and then 
completed a demographic survey that included 
questions about participants’ age, marital status, 
employment status, religion, political views, 
subjectively perceived social status, and COVID 
diagnoses for themselves close family and friends. 
Next, participants consumed their assigned drink (up 
to 10 minutes), after which they watched two 
emotionally neutral movie clips comprising a period of 
                                                          
1 Because conducting a high-powered laboratory study on the effects 
of alcohol requires a considerable amount of resources, we aimed to 
maximize the utility of the invested resources by including several 
survey instruments for a different project at the end. These 
instruments included measures of self-concept (Stake, 1994), moral 
identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002), personality (Gosling et al., 2003), 
51 minutes to allow for alcohol absorption: (1) The 
World From Above, season 10, episode 6 titled Iceland 
- From Vatnajokull National Park to Gullfoss 
Waterfall and (2) The World From Above, season 4, 
episode 7 titled Yellowstone National Park. After the 
movie, blood alcohol levels were measured a second 
time (using the same sound signal in the placebo and 
experimental groups). Next, participants completed 
the main dependent measures. Participants first 
completed the CNI dilemma battery and the OUS, with 
the order of the two instruments being 
counterbalanced across participants. Both the CNI 
dilemmas and the items of the OUS were presented in 
a fixed randomized order that was held constant for all 
participants. The two measures were followed by the 
two versions of the trolley problem, with their order 
being counterbalanced independent of the order of the 
CNI battery and the OUS. Finally, participants 
completed the CRT and several supplementary 
measures that were unrelated to the primary purpose 
of this study.1 The study concluded with a debriefing 
and third measurement of blood alcohol. After the 
debriefing, participants were also asked to guess the 
condition to which they had been assigned.  
Results 
Descriptive statistics of all measured variables are 
presented in Table 1. Correlations between all 
measured variables are presented in Table 2. 
Endorsement of pro-sacrificial harm in the switch 
dilemma showed significant positive correlations with 
endorsement of pro-sacrificial harm in the footbridge 
dilemma, the CNI model’s C parameter, and the IH 
subscale of the OUS, as well as significant negative 
correlations with the CNI model’s N parameter and 
CRT scores. These results suggest that stronger 
endorsement of pro-sacrificial harm in the switch 
dilemma was associated with (1) stronger endorsement 
of pro-sacrificial harm in the footbridge dilemma, (2) 
stronger sensitivity to consequences, (3) stronger 
endorsement of IH,  (4) weaker sensitivity to moral 
norms, and (5) weaker cognitive reflection. 
Endorsement of pro-sacrificial harm in the footbridge 
dilemma showed significant positive correlations with 
the CNI model’s C parameter and the IH subscale of 
the OUS, as well as a significant negative correlation 
with the CNI model’s N parameter. These results 
suggest that stronger endorsement of pro-sacrificial 
harm in the footbridge dilemma was associated with 
(1) stronger sensitivity to consequences, (2) stronger 
and moral foundations (Graham & Haidt, 2012). Because these 
supplementary measures were not intended for the current study and 
the measures were administered at the end, the preregistration did 
not include any of these instruments. Separate preregistrations were 
submitted for the analyses of data obtained with these 
supplementary measures. 
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endorsement of IH, and (3) weaker sensitivity to moral 
norms. Beyond these correlations, the C parameter 
showed a significant negative correlation with the N 
parameter, and significant positive correlations with 
the I parameter, the IH subscale of the OUS, and CRT 
scores. These results suggest that stronger sensitivity 
to consequences was associated with (1) weaker 
sensitivity to moral norms, (2) stronger action 
aversion, (3) stronger endorsement of IH, and (4) 
stronger cognitive reflection. Moreover, the N 
parameter showed a significant positive correlation 
with the I parameter and a significant negative 
correlation with the IH subscale of the OUS, 
suggesting that stronger sensitivity to moral norms 
was associated with (1) weaker action aversion and (2) 
weaker endorsement of IH. Finally, the IH subscale of 
the OUS showed a significant positive correlation with 
the IB subscale and CRT scores, suggesting that 
stronger endorsement of IH was associated with (1) 
stronger endorsement of IB and (2) stronger cognitive 
reflection. 
Manipulation Check 
To test the effectiveness of our alcohol 
manipulation, blood alcohol levels measured with 
breathalyzer were submitted to a 3 (Alcohol Group: 
alcohol vs. no alcohol vs. placebo, between-subjects) 
× 3 (Time: baseline vs. before survey vs. after survey, 
within-subjects) mixed ANOVA, which revealed a 
significant two-way interaction between Group and 
Time, F(4, 652) = 872.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .842 (see 
Table 1). Further analyses revealed that blood alcohol 
levels significantly differed across the three groups 
before the survey, F(2, 326) = 1248.75, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.885, and after the survey, F(2, 326) = 2275.00, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .933, but not at baseline, F(2, 326) = 0.00, 
p = 1.00, ηp2 = .000. Before the survey, blood alcohol 
levels were significantly higher in the alcohol group 
compared to the no-alcohol group, t(326) = 43.20, p < 
.001, d = 5.90, and compared to the placebo group, 
t(326) = 43.70, p < .001, d = 5.90. Similarly, after the 
survey, blood alcohol levels were significantly higher 
in the alcohol group compared to the no-alcohol group, 
t(326) = 58.30, p < .001, d = 7.96, and compared to the 
placebo group, t(326) = 59.00, p < .001, d = 7.96. 
Together, these results confirm the effectiveness of our 
manipulation of blood alcohol. 
Confirmatory Analyses 
Trolley problems. Responses to the two variants 
of the trolley problem were submitted to a 3 (Alcohol 
Group: alcohol vs. no alcohol vs. placebo, between-
subjects) × 2 (Dilemma Type: switch vs. footbridge, 
within-subjects) mixed ANOVA. The ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Dilemma Type, 
                                                          
2 Note that the main effect of Parameter is uninterpretable, because 
the neutral reference point of the I parameter (0.5) differs from the 
indicating that participants were more willing to 
redirect the trolley to a different track than to push a 
man off the bridge, F(1, 326) = 332.02, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.505 (see Table 1). Critically, there was no significant 
main effect of Alcohol Group, F(2, 326) = 2.76, p = 
.065, ηp2 = .017, and no significant interaction between 
Alcohol Group and Dilemma Type, F(2, 326) = 1.57, 
p = .210, ηp2 = .010.  
CNI dilemmas. The three parameters of the CNI 
model were submitted to a 3 (Alcohol Group: alcohol 
vs. no alcohol vs. placebo, between-subjects) × 3 
(Parameter: C vs. N vs. I, within-subjects) mixed 
ANOVA (see Table 1).2 Neither the main effect of 
Alcohol Group, F(2, 326) = 1.24, p = .291, ηp2 = .008, 
nor the interaction between Parameter and Alcohol 
Group, F(4, 652) = 1.30, p = .269, ηp2 = .008, were 
statistically significant.  
OUS. Responses on the OUS were submitted to a 
3 (Alcohol Group: alcohol vs. no alcohol vs. placebo, 
between-subjects) × 2 (Dimension: IH vs. IB, within-
subjects) mixed ANOVA (see Table 1). The main 
effect of Alcohol Group was not significant, F(2, 326) 
= 0.005, p = .995, ηp2 = .000, but the interaction 
between Dimension and Alcohol Group was 
statistically significant, F(2, 326) = 3.04, p = .049, ηp2 
= .018. Descriptively, the placebo group showed 
higher IH scores and lower IB scores compared to the 
other two groups, but none of the relevant post-hoc 
tests reached statistical significance (all ts < 1.35, all 
ps > .193). 
Exploratory Analyses  
Guessed condition. Participants in the no-alcohol 
condition were highly accurate in identifying the 
condition to which they had been assigned (99.1%). 
The same was true for participants in the alcohol 
condition (96.3%). Accuracy was considerably lower 
for participants in the placebo condition (65.8%), with 
23.7% falsely believing that they had consumed 
alcohol. Accuracy levels significantly differed across 
the three groups, χ2(2) = 65.72, p < .001. To investigate 
whether participants’ naïve beliefs about alcohol 
consumption are associated with moral judgments, we 
repeated the main analyses using “guessed alcohol 
group” instead of “actual alcohol group” in the 
ANOVA. There were no significant main or 
interaction effects involving Guessed Alcohol Group 
for responses to the trolley problems (all Fs < 2.51, all 
ps > .083), the three CNI model parameters (all Fs < 
1.54, all ps > .217), and the two dimensions of the OUS 
(all Fs < 2.85, all ps > .059).  
CRT. We performed a univariate ANOVA with 
three conditions (alcohol vs. no alcohol vs. placebo) 
on CRT scores, which revealed a significant difference 
neutral reference point of the C and the N parameter (0), and N 
scores are estimated in a manner that is conditional on C. 
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across groups, F(2, 326) = 3.06, p = .048, ηp2 = .018. 
A planned simple-contrast analysis indicated that this 
effect was driven by higher CRT scores in the placebo 
group (ΔCRT = 0.35), t(326) = 2.39, p = .017, and the 
alcohol group (ΔCRT = 0.26), t(326) = 1.74, p = .083, 
compared to the no-alcohol group (MCRT = 1.45). 
These results suggest that believing one has consumed 
alcohol led to improved performance on the CRT.  
Discussion 
The “drunk utilitarian” phenomenon poses an 
intriguing challenge to the dual-process model of 
moral judgment, which suggests that alcohol-related 
impairments in inhibitory control should reduce rather 
than increase utilitarian judgments. However, because 
the initial demonstration of the phenomenon was 
based on correlational data (Duke & Bègue, 2015) and 
subsequent experimental studies failed to obtain 
significant effects of alcohol on moral dilemma 
judgments (Arutyunova et al., 2017; Francis et al., 
2019), the reliability of the phenomenon is still 
unclear. This state of affairs is exacerbated by several 
limitations of prior research on the effects of alcohol 
on moral judgment, which include (1) relatively low 
(or inconsistent) levels of alcohol consumption; (2) 
lack of a placebo condition in some studies; (3) small 
sample sizes; (4) confounds in the measurement of 
moral dilemma judgments; and (5) generalization to 
utilitarian judgments writ large based on responses to 
sacrificial dilemmas. To address these concerns, the 
current preregistered experiment included a 
manipulation of blood alcohol levels with 
comparatively higher doses of alcohol and a placebo 
condition to disentangle actual effects of alcohol from 
effects of naïve beliefs about effects of alcohol. To 
overcome the known problems associated with small 
samples, the current study tested effects of alcohol 
with a sample that was substantially larger compared 
to prior studies. Finally, to overcome conceptual 
limitations in the interpretation of pro-sacrificial 
judgments in trolley problems, the current study used 
the CNI model to disentangle different aspects of 
moral dilemma judgments and the OUS to measure 
different dimensions of utilitarian psychology.  
Despite these improvements, we failed to obtain 
any significant effect of alcohol on moral judgments. 
Although our manipulation was highly effective in 
influencing blood alcohol levels (measured with a 
breathalyzer), there was no significant effect of 
alcohol on pro-sacrificial judgments in the trolley 
problem, the three parameters of the CNI model, and 
only a weak, placebo-driven effect on the two 
dimensions of utilitarian psychology captured by the 
OUS. Moreover, although performance on the CRT 
tended to be higher in the alcohol condition compared 
to the no-alcohol condition, participants in the placebo 
condition showed a similar performance boost, 
suggesting that participants who believed that they 
consumed alcohol invested extra efforts when 
completing the CRT. Together, these results pose a 
challenge to the “drunk utilitarian” phenomenon and 
raise important questions about how alcohol may 
influence moral judgments, if it has any such effect at 
all.   
One possible explanation for the obtained null 
effects is that the influence of alcohol on inhibitory 
control might be more complex than commonly 
assumed, given that effects of alcohol on inhibitory 
control seem to be highly variable across tasks and 
situations. Consistent with this concern, some studies 
support the hypothesis that alcohol impairs inhibitory 
control, while other studies report null effects of 
alcohol on inhibitory control (e.g., Bartholow et al., 
2018). These mixed findings seem to be be partly 
rooted in different conceptualizations of inhibitory 
control and different approaches to measuring 
inhibitory control. Although inhibitory control is 
generally understood as the ability to suppress 
attention, behavior, thoughts and/or emotions 
(Diamond, 2013), inhibitory control is a multifaceted 
construct that subsumes diverse aspects such as the 
inhibition of prepotent response tendencies, 
suppression of thoughts and memories, and delayed 
gratification. A more nuanced analysis suggests that 
alcohol might differentially affect different aspects of 
inhibitory control (Riedel et al., 2021). Moreover, 
although alcohol has been found to impair response 
inhibition in the stop-signal (de Wit et al. 2000; Loeber 
& Duka 2009; Gan et al. 2014; Roberts et al. 2016) and 
go/no-go tasks (Fillmore & Weafer 2004; Marczinski 
et al. 2005; Field et al. 2010; Korucuoglu et al. 2017; 
Stock et al. 2016), recent evidence suggests that the 
impact of alcohol on response inhibition may depend 
on the particular measure of response inhibition 
(Bartholow et al., 2018; Riedel et al., 2021). Based on 
these findings, the influence of alcohol on inhibitory 
control seems much more complex than presumed in 
research on the effects of alcohol on moral judgment, 
including the current study (see Button et al., 2013).  
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the lack of 
experimental effects of alcohol in the current study and 
prior research (Arutyunova et al., 2017; Francis et al., 
2019) does not necessarily question Duke and Bègue’s 
(2015) correlational findings. Yet, the lack of 
experimental effects does suggest a somewhat 
different interpretation of their original findings, in 
that blood alcohol may not have been the cause of the 
obtained correlations. Instead, these correlations may 
have been driven by individual differences that are 
systematically associated with both alcohol 
consumption and moral dilemma judgments. For 
example, it is possible that individuals who tend to 
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engage in excessive alcohol consumption are less 
concerned about causing harm to themselves and 
others, which could promote a positive correlation 
between blood alcohol levels after a night at the bar 
and pro-sacrificial judgments in the trolley problem. 
To the extent that this association is more pronounced 
for harm that involves direct contact, it would also 
explain why Duke and Bègue (2015) found a stronger 
correlation between blood alcohol and pro-sacrificial 
judgments in the footbridge dilemma than in the 
switch dilemma.   
Limitations 
Although our findings provide more compelling 
evidence regarding the effect of alcohol on moral 
judgment than previous studies, it seems appropriate 
to acknowledge a few limitations. The first limitation 
is the controlled lab setting of the current study. 
Alcohol consumption often occurs in social settings 
(e.g., with friends at a party) and effects of alcohol may 
differ depending on whether it is consumed 
individually or in a social setting. Similar contextual 
influences have been found for placebo effects, which 
can be different in individual and social settings 
(Bodnár et al., 2020). Thus, our lab findings may not 
be representative of the effects of alcohol and alcohol-
related beliefs in general if their influence on moral 
judgments depends on the context. This idea is 
consistent with findings suggesting that moral 
dilemma judgments differ depending on whether they 
are made in an individual or social setting (Rom & 
Conway, 2018). Future research comparing effects of 
alcohol in individual and social settings may help to 
provide deeper insights into the interactive role of 
alcohol and social contexts in shaping moral 
judgments. 
A second limitation is that we did not control for 
biphasic effects of alcohol, in which blood alcohol 
concentration rises to a peak following consumption 
(i.e., ascending limb) and then gradually declines to a 
sober state (i.e., descending limb). With the design 
employed in the current study, it is possible that 
participants’ blood alcohol concentration peaked 
before the movie ended and was already on the 
descending limb by the time they completed the moral 
judgment tasks. Because alcohol can have different 
effects during times of ascending vs. descending blood 
alcohol concentrations, future studies should either 
ensure that participants are making moral judgments at 
the peak time of blood alcohol concentration or 
directly test differential effects of alcohol during the 
ascending vs. descending limb.  
Third, although the current study used a 
comparatively higher dose of alcohol than previous 
studies, it is possible that the administered dose was 
still too low to produce a detectable effect of alcohol 
on moral judgments. Although higher doses of alcohol 
may raise ethical questions about potential harm that 
might be caused to participants, it is possible that the 
correlations in Duke and Bègue’s (2015) study were 
driven by intoxicated participants with higher levels of 
blood alcohol after a night bar, and that the “drunk 
utilitarian” phenomenon would emerge in 
experimental studies with higher levels of blood 
alcohol. In this case, insufficiently high doses of 
alcohol might explain the discrepancy between Duke 
and Bègue’s findings and the results of experimental 
studies, including the current one.  
Fourth, when determining the amount of to-be-
consumed alcohol, we followed the procedures of past 
studies (e.g., Francis et al., 2019) and did not 
differentiate alcohol doses according to gender. 
However, because men and women differ in terms of 
their alcohol metabolism (e.g., Bates et al., 2011; 
Cofresí et al., 2020), one could argue that women 
should have been given smaller doses than men to 
obtain the comparable effects of alcohol even when 
their body weight was comparable (Thomasson, 
2002). Yet, counter to this concern about potential 
gender differences, a 2 (Time) × 2 (Gender) mixed 
ANOVA did not reveal any significant effects of 
Gender on blood alcohol concentration; there was 
neither a significant main effect of Gender, F(1, 327) 
= 0.48, p = .488, nor a significant two-way interaction 
between Time and Gender, F(1, 327) = 0.66, p = .419. 
Finally, following previous studies on moral 
judgment under the influence of alcohol (e.g., Francis 
et al., 2019), we used body weight to determine the 
amount of to-be-consumed alcohol. However, an 
alternative approach is to use participants’ total body 
water (rather than weight) to determine the ideal dose 
of alcohol in laboratory studies (Watson, 1989). In this 
method, the dose of alcohol required to produce a 
specific peak blood alcohol level is assumed to be a 
function of the participant’s total body water, duration 
of the drinking period, time to peak blood alcohol 
level, and alcohol metabolism rate. Future studies 
might use Watson’s published formulas for this 
alternative approach to determine the ideal dose of 
alcohol (Curtin & Fairchild, 2003).  
Conclusions 
There are reasons to believe that alcohol may 
influence moral judgments. On the one hand, alcohol 
may impair inhibitory control and extant theories 
suggest that impaired inhibitory control should reduce 
the endorsement of pro-sacrificial harm for the greater 
good. On the other hand, “drinking is […] like taking 
one’s foot off the brake” (Heath & Hardy-Vallée, 
2015, p. 2), which is consistent with the greater 
willingness to cause pro-sacrificial harm in the “drunk 
utilitarian” phenomenon. However, counter to either 
of these ideas, we did not find any effects of alcohol 
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on moral judgments. Because the current study 
addressed several limitations of prior research on this 
question and nevertheless did not find any evidence for 
a causal effect of alcohol on moral judgments, we 
conclude that the “drunk utilitarian” phenomenon 
needs to be revisited.  
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Figure 1 




Note. The schematic individuals in the lower right corner represent three research assistants (informally 
referred to as policeman, bartender, and courier) responsible for the different tasks described in the 
Procedure section. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for all measured variables 
 Alcohol No Alcohol Placebo 
 M 95% CI M 95% CI M 95% CI 
BAC        
Baseline 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 
Before Survey 0.69 [0.65, 0.73] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 
After Survey 0.54 [0.51, 0.56] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 
Trolley Problems       
Switch  5.01 [4.65, 5.37] 4.96 [4.61, 5.32] 5.25 [4.92, 5.58] 
Footbridge  3.12 [2.76, 3.49] 2.62 [2.30, 2.95] 3.31 [2.94, 3.68] 
CNI Model       
C Parameter 0.23 [0.21, 0.26] 0.26 [0.23, 0.30] 0.30 [0.27, 0.33] 
N Parameter 0.60 [0.54, 0.66] 0.60 [0.54, 0.66] 0.58 [0.52, 0.64] 
I Parameter 0.67 [0.61, 0.72] 0.73 [0.68, 0.78] 0.69 [0.64, 0.75] 
OUS       
IH 3.28 [3.06, 3.49] 3.24 [3.01, 3.46] 3.43 [3.24, 3.62] 
IB 3.68 [3.46, 3.91] 3.71 [3.47, 3.95] 3.50 [3.31, 3.70] 
CRT 1.71 [1.49, 1.93] 1.45 [1.25, 1.65] 1.80 [1.60, 2.00] 
Note. BAC = Blood Alcohol Concentration in Permille (‰) Measured with Breathalyzer. Switch = 
Switch Dilemma, Footbridge = Footbridge Dilemma, C = Sensitivity to Consequences, N = Sensitivity to 
Moral Norms, I = General Preference for Inaction versus Action, OUS = Oxford Utilitarianism Scale, IH 




Pearson’s correlations between measured variables 
 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Switch  .40** .25** -.17** .02 .24** .10 -.14** 
2. Footbridge  - .20** -.34** -.06 .30** .08 -.01 
3. C Parameter  - -.14* .12* .25** .05 .18** 
4. N Parameter   - .20** -.31** -.02 -.05 
5. I Parameter    - .04 -.04 .08 
6. OUS-IH     - .35** .16** 
7. OUS-IB      - -.02 
8. CRT       - 
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01. Switch = Switch Dilemma, Footbridge = Footbridge Dilemma, C = Sensitivity 
to Consequences, N = Sensitivity to Moral Norms, I = General Preference for Inaction versus Action, 
OUS = Oxford Utilitarianism Scale, IH = Instrumental Harm, IB = Impartial Beneficence, CRT = 
Cognitive Reflection Test. Breathalyzer scores are not included in the table, because two thirds of 
participants in the sample (i.e., those in the no-alcohol and the placebo conditions) have a score of zero. 
 
 
